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Abstract
We provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first computa-
tional study of extensive-form adversarial team games. These
games are sequential, zero-sum games in which a team of
players, sharing the same utility function, faces an adversary.
We define three different scenarios according to the commu-
nication capabilities of the team. In the first, the teammates
can communicate and correlate their actions both before and
during the play. In the second, they can only communicate
before the play. In the third, no communication is possible
at all. We define the most suitable solution concepts, and we
study the inefficiency caused by partial or null communica-
tion, showing that the inefficiency can be arbitrarily large in
the size of the game tree. Furthermore, we study the compu-
tational complexity of the equilibrium-finding problem in the
three scenarios mentioned above, and we provide, for each
of the three scenarios, an exact algorithm. Finally, we em-
pirically evaluate the scalability of the algorithms in random
games and the inefficiency caused by partial or null commu-
nication.
Introduction
The design of algorithms for strategic settings has been a
central problem in Artificial Intelligence for several years,
with the aim of developing agents capable of behaving op-
timally when facing strategic opponents. Many efforts have
been made for 2-player games, e.g., finding a Nash equilib-
rium (Lemke and Howson, Jr 1964; Gatti et al. 2012) and,
more recently, finding a Stackelberg equilibrium (Conitzer
and Sandholm 2006). The study of this latter problem paved
the way to the field of Security Games, which is, nowadays,
one of the application fields of non-cooperative game theory
with the highest social impact (Tambe 2011).
Fewer results are known, instead, about games with more
than 2 players—except for games with particular structures,
e.g., congestion and polymatrix games (Nisan et al. 2007).
An interesting class of games widely unexplored in the lit-
erature is that one of adversarial team games. Here, a team
of players with the same utilities faces an adversary (von
Stengel and Koller 1997). These games can model many re-
alistic security scenarios and can provide tools to coordinate
teammates acting strategically. Basilico et al. (2017) study
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the inefficiency a team can incur in normal-form games
when teammates cannot correlate their strategies w.r.t. when
they can. They also provide algorithms to approximate the
Team-maxmin equilibrium—introduced by von Stengel and
Koller (1997)—that is the optimal solution when correlation
is not possible. Furthermore, it is known that finding a Team-
maxmin equilibrium is FNP-hard and inapproximable in ad-
ditive sense (Hansen et al. 2008; Borgs et al. 2010).
When extensive-form games enter the picture, adversarial
team games become much more intriguing, various forms of
correlation being possible. Nevertheless, to the best of our
knowledge, this game class is still unexplored in the liter-
ature. In the present paper, we focus on three main forms
of correlation (Forges 1986). In the first, preplay and in-
traplay communication is possible, corresponding to the
case in which a communication device receives inputs from
the teammates about the information they observe during
the play, and sends them recommendations about the ac-
tion to play at each information set. In the second, only pre-
play communication among the teammates is possible, cor-
responding to the case in which a correlation device commu-
nicates a plan of actions to each teammate before playing the
game.1 Finally, in the third, no communication is possible2.
Original contributions. We formally define game mod-
els capturing the three aforementioned cases and the most
suitable solution concepts (trivially, the Team-maxmin equi-
librium in the third setting). Furthermore, we define three
1With only preplay correlation, three solution concepts are
known: Normal-Form, Extensive-Form, and Agent-Form Corre-
lated Equilibrium. The spaces of players’ strategies achievable with
the three correlation devices are the same, while the players’ incen-
tive constraints are different (even if it is not known whether the
spaces of the outcomes for the three equilibria in adversarial team
games are different). The complexity of computing the equilibrium
maximizing the team’s utility in adversarial team games with at
least 2 teammates is NP-hard for all the three equilibria (von Sten-
gel and Forges 2008). In our paper, we focus on the first one.
2This setting is frequent in practice. Consider, for example, a
security problem where a set of defensive resources from differ-
ent security agencies are allocated to protect an environment at risk
but, due to organizational constraints, they are not able to share in-
formation with each other. The resources have the same goal (i.e.,
to secure the environment) but cannot coordinate strategy execu-
tion. The same happens when a set of resources has to operate in
stealth mode.
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inefficiency indices for the equilibria, capturing: the ineffi-
ciency caused by using a correlation device in place of a
communication device, the inefficiency caused by not using
any form of communication in place of a communication
device, and the inefficiency caused by not using any form of
communication in place of a correlation device. We provide
lower bounds to the worst-case values of the inefficiency in-
dices, showing that they can be arbitrarily large.
Furthermore, we study the computational complexity of
the problems of finding the three equilibria with the differ-
ent forms of correlation, and we design, for each equilib-
rium, an exact algorithm. We show that when a communi-
cation device is available, an equilibrium can be computed
in polynomial time (even in the number of players) by a
2-stage algorithm. In the first stage, the game is cast into
an auxiliary 2-player equivalent game, while, in the second
stage, a solution is found by linear programming. When a
correlation device is available, the problem can be easily
shown to be FNP-hard. In this case, we prove that there is
always an equilibrium with a small (linear) support, and we
design an equilibrium-finding algorithm, based on a classi-
cal column-generation approach, that does not need to enu-
merate an exponential space of actions before its execution.
Our algorithm exploits an original hybrid representation of
the game combining both normal and sequence forms. The
column-generation oracle is shown to deal with an APX-
hard problem, with an upper approximation bound decreas-
ing exponentially in the depth of the tree. We also provide an
approximation algorithm for the oracle that matches certain
approximation guarantees on a subset of instances. When no
communication is possible, the equilibrium-finding problem
can be easily shown to be FNP-hard. In this case, the prob-
lem can be formulated as a non-linear programming problem
and solved by resorting to global optimization tools.
Finally, we empirically evaluate the scalability of our al-
gorithms in random game instances. We also evaluate the
inefficiency for the team of not adopting a communication
device, showing that, differently from the theoretical worst-
case bounds, the empirical inefficiency is extremely small.
Preliminaries
A perfect-information extensive-form game (Shoham and
Leyton-Brown 2009) is a tuple pN,A, V, L, ι, ρ, χ, Uq,
where: N is a set of n players, A is a set of actions, V is the
set of nonterminal decision nodes, L is the set of terminal
(leaf) nodes, ι : V Ñ N is a function returning the player
acting at a given decision node, ρ : V Ñ 2A is the action
function—assigning to each choice node a set of available
actions—, χ : V ˆ A Ñ V Y L is the successor func-
tion, and U “ tU1, U2, . . . , Unu is the set of utility func-
tions in which Ui : L Ñ R specifies utilities over terminal
nodes for player i. Let Vi be the inclusion-wise maximal
set of decision nodes such that, for all x P Vi, i “ ιpxq.
Then, an imperfect-information extensive-form game is a tu-
ple pN,A, V, L, ι, ρ, χ, U,Hq, where pN,A, V, L, ι, ρ, χ, Uq
is an extensive-form game with perfect information and
H “ tH1, H2, . . . ,Hnu is the set of information sets, in
which Hi is a partition of Vi such that, for any x1, x2 P Vi,
ρpx1q “ ρpx2qwhenever there exists a h P Hi where x1 P h
and x2 P h. As usual in game theory, we assume, for each
a P A, there is only one h s.t. a P ρphq. We focus on games
with perfect recall where, for each player i and each h P Hi,
decision nodes belonging to h share the same sequence of
moves of player i on their paths from the root.
The study of extensive-form games is commonly con-
ducted under other equivalent representations. The normal
form is a tabular representation in which player i’s actions
are plans p P Pi, specifying a move at each information set
in Hi, and player i’s utility is U 1i : P1 ˆ . . . ˆ Pn Ñ R s.t.
U 1ipp1, . . . , pnq “ Uiplq, where l P L is the terminal node
reached when playing plan profile pp1, . . . , pnq. Basically,
in the normal-form representation, players decide their be-
havior in the whole game ex ante the play. The reduced nor-
mal form is obtained by deleting replicated strategies from
the normal form. However, the size of the reduced normal
form is exponential in the number of information sets. A
mixed strategy σi of player i P N is a probability distri-
bution on her set of pure strategies Pi. In the agent form—
whose definition is omitted due to reasons of space, see (Sel-
ten 1975)—, players play behavioral strategies, denoted by
piiph, aq, each specifying a probability distribution over the
actions ρphq available at information set h of player i. Two
strategies, even of different representations, are realization
equivalent if, for any strategy profile of the opponents, they
induce the same probability distribution over the outcomes.
In a finite perfect-recall game, any mixed strategy can be
replaced by an equivalent behavioral one (Kuhn 1953).
Both normal and agent forms suffer from computational
issues that can be overcome by using the sequence form (von
Stengel 1996), whose size is linear in the size of the game
tree. A sequence for player i, defined by a node x of the
game tree, is the subset of A specifying player i’s actions
on the path from the root to x. We denote the set of se-
quences of player i by Qi, these are the sequence-form ac-
tions of player i. A sequence is said terminal if, together
with some sequences of the other players, leads to a termi-
nal node. Moreover, we denote by qH the fictitious sequence
leading to the root node and with qa P Qi the extended se-
quence obtained by appending a P A to sequence q P Qi.
The sequence-form strategy, said realization plan, is a func-
tion ri : Qi Ñ R associating each sequence q P Qi with its
probability of being played. A well-defined sequence-form
strategy is such that, for each i P N , ripqHq “ 1, for each h
and sequence q leading to h, ´ripqq `řaPρphq ripqaq “ 0
and ripqq ě 0. Constraints are linear in the number of se-
quences and can be written as Fi ri “ fi, where Fi is an
opportune matrix and fi is an opportune vector. The utility
function of player i is represented as an n-dimensional ma-
trix defined only for profiles of terminal sequences leading
to a leaf. With a slight abuse of notation, we denote it by Ui.
A Nash equilibrium (NE), whose definition does not de-
pend on the representation of the game, is a strategy profile
in which no player can improve her utility by deviating from
her strategy once fixed the strategies of all the other players.
Extensive-Form Adversarial Team Games,
Equilibria, and Inefficiency
We initially provide the formal definition of a team.
Definition 1 (Team) Given an extensive-form game with
imperfect information pN,A, V, L, ι, ρ, χ, U,Hq, a team T
is an inclusion-wise maximal subset of players T Ď N such
that, for any i, j P T , for all l P L, Uiplq “ Ujplq.
We denote by HT the set
Ť
iPT Hi and by AT the set
of actions available at the information sets in HT . An
extensive-form team game (EF-TG) is a generic extensive-
form game where at least one team is present. Von Sten-
gel and Koller (1997) analyze zero-sum normal-form games
where a single team plays against an adversary. We extend
this game model to the scenario of extensive-form games.
Definition 2 (STSA-EF-TG) A zero-sum single-team
single-adversary extensive-form team game (STSA-EF-TG)
is a game pN,A, V, L, ι, ρ, χ, U,Hq in which:
• N “ T Y tnu, where set T defines a team T (as in Defi-
nition 1) and player n is the adversary (A);
• for each l P L it holds: UAplq “ ´pn ´ 1qUT plq, where
UT denotes the utility of teammates and UA that one of
the adversary.
When the teammates have no chance to correlate their strate-
gies, the most appropriate solution concept is the Team-
maxmin equilibrium (TME). Formally, the TME is defined
as arg maxr1,...,rn´1 minrn UT
śn
i“1 ri. By using the same
arguments used by von Stengel and Koller (1997) for the
case of normal-form games, it follows that also in extensive-
form games a TME is unique except for degeneracy and
it is the NE maximizing team’s expected utility. Neverthe-
less, in many scenarios, teammates may exploit higher cor-
relation capabilities. While in normal-form games these ca-
pabilities reduce to employing a correlation device as pro-
posed by (Aumann 1974), in extensive-form games we can
distinguish different forms of correlation. More precisely,
the strongest correlation is achieved when teammates can
communicate both before and during the execution of the
game (preplay and intraplay communication), exchanging
their private information by exploiting a mediator that rec-
ommends actions to them. This setting can be modeled by
resorting to a communication device defined in a similar way
to (Forges 1986). A weaker correlation is achieved when
teammates can communicate only before the play (preplay
communication). This setting can be modeled by resorting to
a correlation device analogous to that one for normal-form
games. We formally define these two devices as follows (as
customary, ∆p¨q denotes the simplex over ¨).
Definition 3 (Communication device) A communication
device is a triple pHT , AT , RComq where HT is the set of
inputs (i.e., information sets) that teammates can communi-
cate to the mediator, AT is the set of outputs (i.e., actions)
that the mediator can recommend to the teammates, and
RCom : 2HT ˆ 2AT Ñ ∆pAT q is the recommendation
function that associates each information set h P HT
with a probability distribution over ρphq, as a function of
information sets previously reported by teammates and of
the actions recommended by the mediator in the past.
Definition 4 (Correlation device) A correlation device is a
pair ptPiuiPT , RCorq.RCor : ŚiPT Pi Ñ ∆pŚiPT Piq is the
recommendation function which returns a probability distri-
bution over the reduced joint plans of the teammates.
Notice that, while a communication device provides its
recommendations drawing actions from probability distri-
butions during the game, a correlation device does that only
before the beginning of the game. Resorting to these defini-
tions, we introduce the following solution concepts.
Definition 5 (Team-maxmin equilibrium variations)
Given a communication device—or a correlation device—
for the team, a Team-maxmin equilibrium with communi-
cation device (TMECom)—or a Team-maxmin equilibrium
with correlation device (TMECor)—is a Nash equilibrium
in which all teammates follow their recommendations and,
only for TMECom, report truthfully their information.
Notice that in our setting (i.e., zero-sum games), both
TMECom and TMECor maximize team’s utility. We state
the following, whose proof is straightforward.
Property 1 (Strategy space) The space of lotteries over
the outcomes achievable by using a communication device
includes that one of the lotteries achievable by using a cor-
relation device, that, in its turn, includes the space of the
lotteries achievable without any device.
Let vNo, vCom, vCor be the utility of the team at, respec-
tively, the TME, the TMECom and the TMECor. From the
property above, we can easily derive the following.
Property 2 (Equilibria utility) The game values obtained
with the different solution concepts introduced above are
such that vCom ě vCor ě vNo.
In order to evaluate the inefficiency due to the impossibil-
ity of adopting a communication or correlation device, we
resort to the concept of Price of Uncorrelation (PoU ), previ-
ously introduced in (Basilico et al. 2017) as a measure of the
inefficiency of the TME w.r.t. the TMECor in normal-form
games. In these games, the PoU is defined as the ratio be-
tween the utility given by the TMECor and the utility given
by the TME, once all the team’s payoffs are normalized in
r0, 1s. For extensive-form games, we propose the following
variations of the PoU to capture all the possible combina-
tions of different forms of correlation.
Definition 6 (Inefficiency indices) PoUCom/No “ vComvNo ,
PoUCor/No “ vCorvNo , PoUCom/Cor “ vComvCor .
In perfect-information games all these indices assume a
value of 1, the solution being unique unless degeneracy by
backward induction. With imperfect information the indices
can be larger than 1. In normal-form games, the tight upper
bound to PoU is mn´2, where m is the number of actions
of each player and n is the number of players (Basilico et
al. 2017). Using a definition based on m is not suitable for
extensive-form games, where each player may have a differ-
ent number of actions per node. Thus, we state the bounds in
terms of |L| (i.e., the number of terminal nodes). The follow-
ing three examples provide lower bounds to the worst-case
values of the indices, showing that the inefficiency may be
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Figure 1: A game with a spy used in Example 1.
arbitrarily large in L. Initially, to ease the presentation, we
define a specific type of team player that we call spy.
Definition 7 (Spy player) Player i P T is said to be a spy
if, for each h P Hi, |ρphq| “ 1 and h is a singleton.
A spy just observes the actual state of the game and her con-
tribution to the play is only due to her communication capa-
bilities. Notice that the introduction of a spy after decision
nodes of the adversary does not affect the team’s utility in a
TMECor (the team’s joint plans are the same) but improves
the team’s capabilities, and final utility, in a TMECom.
Example 1 (Lower bound for worst-case PoUCom/No)
Consider a STSA-EF-TG with n players and m ě 2 actions
for each player at every decision node except for the first
team player, who is a spy. The game tree is structured as
follows (see Figure 1 for the case with n “ 3).
• The adversary plays first;
• then the spy observes her move;
• each one of the other teammates is assigned one of the fol-
lowing levels of the game tree and all her decision nodes
are part of the same information set;
• UT “ 1 iff, for each i P T zt1u and for each h P Hi, the
action chosen at h is equal to the one selected by A.
We have vCom “ 1, vNo “ m2´n and thus PoUCom/No “
mn´2. Since the tree structure is such that |L| “ mn´1
we obtain PoUCom/No “ |L|p1´ 1n´1 q. Once |L| is fixed, the
inefficiency is monotonically increasing in n, but n is upper
bounded by n “ log2p|L|q ` 1 (corresponding to the case
in which each team player except the spy has the minimum
number of actions, i.e., 2). It follows that, in the worst case
w.r.t. n, PoUCom/No “ |L|2 .
Example 2 (Lower bound for worst-case PoUCor/No)
Consider a STSA-EF-TG with n players and m actions
at each of their decision nodes, in which each level of
the game tree is associated with one player and forms
a unique information set. UT “ 1 iff all the teammates
choose the same action of the adversary, who plays first.
This case corresponds to the worst case for PoU in
normal-form games. Here we formulate the bound in
terms of |L|. We have vNo “ m1´n and vCor “ 1{m. It
follows that PoUCor/No “ mn´2. This time, |L| “ mn
and thus PoUCor/No “ |L|p1´ 2n q. The worst case w.r.t. n
is reached when m “ 2 and n “ log2p|L|q. Therefore,
PoUCor/No “ |L|4 .
Example 3 (Lower bound for worst-case PoUCom/Cor)
Consider the game presented in Example 1. Since vCom “ 1
and vCor “ 1{m, it follows PoUCom/Cor “ m. The struc-
ture of the game tree is such that |L| “ mn´1 and thus
PoUCom/Cor “ |L| 1n´1 . Notice that, in this case, the inef-
ficiency is maximized when n “ 3, which corresponds to
having a team of two members. Thus, in the worst case w.r.t.
n, PoUCom/Cor “
a|L|.
Finding a TMECom
We show that there is a polynomial-time TMECom-finding
algorithm. Indeed, we prove that the problem of finding a
TMECom is equivalent to finding a 2-player maxmin strat-
egy in an auxiliary 2-player game with perfect recall and that
the auxiliary game can be built in polynomial time.
First, we define the structure of the auxiliary game we use.
Let Γ be an extensive-form game and Q “ ŤiPN Qi. We
define the following functions. Function lead : V YLÑ 2Q
returns the sequence profile constituting the path from the
root to a given node of the tree. Function path : V ˆ 2N Ñ
2Q is s.t., for each x P V and each set of players G Ď N ,
pathpx|Gq “
#
q Ă ď
iPG
Qi
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇDq1 Ă ď
iPNzG
Qi ^ q Y q1 “ leadpxq
+
.
Intuitively, pathpx|Gq returns the unique profile of se-
quences of players in G leading to x when combined with
some sequences of the players in NzG.
The following definition describes the information struc-
ture of the auxiliary extensive-form game.
Definition 8 (G-observable game) For any game Γ “
pN,A, V, L, ι, ρ, χ,Hq and any set of players G Ď N ,
the G-observable game Γˆ is a tuple pN,A, V, L, ι, ρ, χ, Hˆq,
where Hˆ “
´Ť
iPG Hˆi
¯
Y
´Ť
iPNzGHi
¯
is such that:
1. for each decision node x P V , there exists one and only
one hˆ P Hˆ s.t. x P hˆ and ιphq “ ιphˆq where h denotes the
information set containing x in Γ;
2. for each player i P G, Hˆi is the set with the lowest pos-
sible cardinality s.t. for each hˆ P Hˆi and for each pair of
decision nodes x, x1 P hˆ, it holds:´
pathpx|Gq “ pathpx1|Gq
¯
^
´
Dh P Hi|x P h^x1 P h
¯
.
In a G-observable extensive-form game, players belonging
to G are fully aware of the moves of other players in G and
share the same information on the moves taken by players in
NzG. We show that we can build Γˆ in polynomial time.
Lemma 1 (T -observable game construction)
The T-observable game Γˆ of a generic STSA-EF-TG Γ can
be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. We provide the sketch of an algorithm (the pseu-
docode is provided in the Appendices) to build a T -
observable game (i.e., a G-observable game with G “ T )
in time and space polynomial in the size of the game tree.
The algorithm employs nested hash-tables. The first hash-
table associates each joint sequence of the team with another
hash-table, which is indexed over information sets and has
as value the information set id to be used in Γˆ. Γ is traversed
in a depth-first manner while keeping track of the sequence
leading to the current node. For each x P V s.t. ιpxq P T ,
a search/insertion over the first hash-table is performed by
hashing pathpx|T q. Then, once the sequence-specific hash-
table is found, the information set is assigned a new id if it is
not already present as a key. Γˆ is built by associating to each
decision node of the team a new information set as specified
in the hash-table. The worst-case running time isOp|V |2q.l
Theorem 2 (TMECom computation) Given a STSA-EF-
TG and a communication device for T , the unique (unless
degeneracy) TMECom can be found in polynomial time.
Proof. Given a STSA-EF-TG Γ, the use of a communica-
tion device for the team T changes the information structure
of the game inducing a T -observable game Γˆ. A TMECom
can be computed over Γˆ as follows. Given a communica-
tion device pHT , AT , RComq, RCom enforces a probability
distribution γ over the set of feedback rules. γ is chosen
in order to maximize the expected utility of the team. In
this setting, no incentive constraints are required because
teammates share the same utility function and therefore, un-
der the hypothesis that γ maximizes it, it is in their best
interest to follow the recommendations sent by the device
and to report truthfully their information. Thus, considering
the function path to be defined over information sets and
HˆT “ ŤiPT Hˆi, γ reduces to a distribution over rules of
type tβ “ pβhqhPHˆT |βh : pathph|T q Ñ ρphq,@h P HˆT u.
We are left with an optimization problem in which we
have to choose γ s.t. the worst-case utility of the team is
maximized. This is equivalent to a 2-player maxmin prob-
lem over Γˆ betweenA and a player playing over team’s joint
sequences. By construction, the team player has perfect re-
call and thus the maxmin problem can be formulated as an
LP in sequence form, requiring polynomial time. l
Finding a TMECor
We initially focus on the computational complexity of the
problem of searching for a TMECor.
Theorem 3 (TMECor complexity) Finding a TMECor is
FNP-hard when there are two teammates, each with an ar-
bitrary number of information sets, or when there is an arbi-
trary number of teammates, each with one information set.
The first result directly follows from the reduction presented
in (von Stengel and Forges 2008, Theorem 1.3) since the
game instances used in the reduction are exactly STSA-EF-
TGs with 2 teammates. The second result can be proved
by adapting the reduction described in (Koller and Megiddo
1992, Proposition 2.6), assigning each information set of the
game instances to a different teammate.
In principle, a TMECor can be found by casting the game
in normal form and then by searching for a Team-maxmin
equilibrium with correlated strategies. This latter equilib-
rium can be found in polynomial time in the size of the nor-
mal form, which, however, is given by P1ˆ . . .ˆPn, where
each Pi is exponentially large in the size of the tree. We pro-
vide here a more efficient method that can also be used in an
anytime fashion, without requiring any exponential enumer-
ation before the execution of the algorithm. In our method,
we use a hybrid representation that, to the best of our knowl-
edge, has not been used in previous works.
Hybrid representation. In our representation, A’s strat-
egy is represented in sequence form, while the team plays
over jointly-reduced plans, as formally defined below. Given
a generic STSA-EF-TG Γ, let us denote with Pr “
tPr,1, . . . , Pr,nu the set of actions of the reduced normal-
form of Γ, where Pr,i is the set of reduced plans for player i.
Therefore,
Ś
iPT Pr,i is the set of joint reduced plans of the
team. Let function terminal : QAˆtŚiPT Pr,iu Ñ LYt∅u
be s.t. it returns, for a given pair pqA, pq, the terminal node
reached when the adversary plays qA and the team mem-
bers, at each of their information set, play according to p. If
no terminal node is reached, ∅ is returned. We define some
equivalence classes over
Ś
iPT Pr,i by the relation „:
Definition 9 The equivalence relation „ over ŚiPT Pr,i is
s.t., given p1, p2 P ŚiPT Pr,i, p1 „ p2 iff, for each qA P
QA, terminalpqA, p1q “ terminalpqA, p2q.
Definition 10 (Jointly-reduced plans) The set of jointly-
reduced plans Pjr Ď ŚiPT Pr,i is obtained by picking ex-
actly one representative from each equivalence class of „.
The team’s utility function is represented by the sparse
|QA| ˆ |Pjr| matrix Uh. Given a pair pqA, pjrq P
QA ˆ Pjr, UT pterminalpqA, pjrqq is stored in Uh iff
terminalpqA, pjrq ‰ ∅. Notice that Uh is well defined since
each pair pqA, pjrq leads to at most one terminal-node.
Let σT denote the team’s strategy over Pjr. The problem
of finding a TMECor in our hybrid representation can be
formulated as the following LP named HYBRID-MAXMIN:
arg max
σT ,v
ÿ
hPHAYthHu
fAphqvphq s.t.
ÿ
hPHAYthHu
FAph, qAqvphq ´
ÿ
pPPjr
UhpqA, pqσT ppq ď 0 @qA P QA
ÿ
pPPjr
σT ppq “ 1
σT ppq ě 0 @p P Pjr
composed of |QA| ` 1 constraints (except σT ppq ě 0 con-
straints) and an exponential number of variables σT . Thus,
we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exists at least one TMECor in which
the number of joint plans played with strictly positive prob-
ability by the team is at most |QA|.
Proof. The above LP admits a basic optimal solution with at
most |QA| ` 1 variables with strictly positive values (Shap-
ley and Snow 1950). Since v is always in the basis (indeed,
we can add a constant to make the team’s utility in each
terminal node strictly positive without affecting equilibrium
strategies), the joint plans in the basis are |QA|. l
Proposition 1 shows that the NP-hardness of the problem
is merely due to guessing the jointly-reduced plans played
with strictly positive probability in a TMECor. Thus, we can
avoid enumerating entirely Pjr before executing the algo-
rithm by working with a subset of jointly-reduced plans built
progressively, in a classical column-generation fashion (see,
e.g., (McMahan, Gordon, and Blum 2003)).
Column-generation algorithm. The pseudocode is given
in Algorithm 1. It receives in input the game tree and
the sequence-form constraint matrices Fi of all the play-
ers (Line 1). Then, the algorithm is initialized, assigning
a matrix of zeros to Uh, an empty set to Pcur, and 0 to
v (Line 2). Notice that Uh is sparse and therefore its rep-
resentation requires a space equal to the number of non-
null entries. rA is initialized as a realization plan equivalent
to a uniform behavioral mixed strategy, i.e., the adversary,
at each information set, randomizes uniformly over all the
available actions (Line 3). Then, the algorithm calls the BR-
ORACLE (defined below) to find the best response of the
team given the adversary’s strategy rA (Line 4). Lines 7-10
are repeated until an optimal solution is found. Initially, br is
added to Pcur (Line 7) and players’ utilities at nodes reached
by pqA, brq for every qA are added to Uh. Then, the algo-
rithm solves the maxmin (HYBRID-MAXMIN) and minmax
(HYBRID-MINMAX) problems restricted to Pcur (Lines 8
and 9), where the HYBRID-MINMAX problem is defined as:
arg min
rA,v
v s.t.
v ´ ÿ
qPQA
Uhpq, pjrqrApqq ě 0 @pjr P Pjr
ÿ
qPQA
FAph, qq “ fAphq @h P HA
rApqq ě 0 @q P QA
Finally, the algorithm calls BR-ORACLE to find the best
response to rA (Line 10).
Best-response oracle. Given a generic STSA-EF-TG Γ,
we denote the problem of finding the best response of the
team against a given a fixed realization plan rA of the adver-
sary over Γ as BR-T. This problem is shown to be NP-hard
in the reduction used for (von Stengel and Forges 2008, The-
orem 1.3), where we can interpret the initial chance move as
the fixed strategy of the adversary. We can strengthen such
a hardness result as follows (the proofs are provided in the
Appendices):
Theorem 4 BR-T is APX-hard.
Let αp¨q P r0, 1s be the best approximation bound of the
maximization problem p¨q.
Theorem 5 Denote with BR-T-h the problem BR-T over
STSA-EF-TG instances of fixed maximum depth 3h and
branching factor variable at each decision-node, it holds:
αBT-T-h ď pαMAX-SATqh.
This means that the upper bound on the approximation factor
decreases exponentially as the depth of the tree increases3.
The column-generation oracle solving BR-T can be formu-
lated as the following integer linear program (ILP):
3Notice that αMAX-SAT ď 7{8, see (Ha˚stad 2001).
Algorithm 1 Hybrid Column Generation
1: function HYBRID-COL-GEN(Γ, F1, . . . , Fn´1, FA) Ź Γ is a generic
STSA-EF-TG and Fi are sequence-form constraint matrices
2: Uh “ 0, Pcur “ tu, v Ð 0 Ź initialization
3: rA Ð realization plan equivalent to a uniform behavioral mixed strategy
4: br Ð BR-ORACLEpΓ, tF1, . . . , Fn´1u, rAq Ź call to the oracle
5: while br R Pcur do
6: Pcur Ð Pcur Y br
7: players’ utilities in pqA, brq for every qA are added to Uh
8: σT Ð solve HYBRID-MAXMIN problem with pUh, Pcur, FAq
9: rA Ð solve HYBRID-MINMAX problem with pUh, Pcur, FAq
10: br Ð BR-ORACLEpΓ, tF1, . . . , Fn´1u, rAq
11: return prA, σT q
arg max
r1,...,rpn´1q,x
ÿ
lPL
UT plqxplqrAppathpl|tnuqq s.t.
ÿ
qiPQi
Fiph, qiqripqiq “ fiphq @iPT,@hPHiYthHu
xplq ď ripqiq @iPT,@lPL,@qiPpathpl|tiuq
xplq P t0, 1u @l P L
where xplq is a binary variable which is equal to 1 iff, for
all the sequences qi P Q necessary to reach l, it holds
ripqiq “ 1. Notice that the oracle returns a pure realiza-
tion plan for each of the teammates. Team’s best-response
is a jointly-reduced realization plan that can be derived as
follows. Denote with QLi the set of sequences played with
probability one by i that are not subsets of any other se-
quence played with positive probability. Let p1i be the re-
duced normal-form plan of player i specifying all and only
actions played in the sequences belonging to QLi . The joint
plan p1 “ pp11, . . . , p1n´1q is s.t. p1 P Pjr.
A simple approximation algorithm can be obtained by a
continuous relaxation of the binary constraints xplq P t0, 1u.
The resulting mathematical program is linear and there-
fore solvable in polynomial time. An approximated solu-
tion can be obtained by randomized rounding (Raghavan
and Tompson 1987). When considering game trees encod-
ing MAX-SAT instances (see the proof of Theorems 4), the
approximation algorithm matches the ratio guaranteed by
randomized-rounding for MAX-SAT (details are given in the
Appendices).
Finding a TME
We recall that finding a TME is hard, since it is hard even
with normal-form games (Hansen et al. 2008).
Theorem 6 (TME complexity) Finding a TME is FNP-
hard and its value is inapproximable in additive sense even
with binary payoffs.
The problem of finding a TME can be formulated as the fol-
lowing non-linear mathematical programming problem:
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Figure 2: Average empiric inefficiency indices with 3 players and some values of ν.
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Figure 3: Average compute times of the algorithms and their box plots with 3 players and ν “ 0.5.
max
r1,...,rpn´1q
vphHq s.t.ÿ
hPHAYthHu
FAph, qAqvphq ď
ď ÿ
qT PQT
pUT pqT , qAq
ź
iPT
ripqT piqqq @qA P QA
ÿ
qiPQi
Fiph, qiqripqiq “ fiphq @iPT,@hPHiYthHu
ripqiq ě 0 @iPT,@qiPQi
where QT is the set of team’s joint sequences and qT piq
identifies the sequence of player i in qT . This program can
be solved exactly, within a given numerical accuracy, by
means of global optimization tools in exponential time.
Experimental Evaluation
Experimental setting. Our experimental setting is based on
randomly generated STSA-EF-TGs. The random game gen-
erator takes as inputs: the number n of players, a probability
distribution over the number of actions available at each in-
formation set, the maximum depth d of the tree, and a param-
eter ν for tuning the information structure of the tree. Specif-
ically, this parameter encodes the probability with which a
newly created decision-node, once it has been randomly as-
signed to a player, is assigned to an existing information-set
(thus, when it is equal to 0 the game is with perfect infor-
mation), while guaranteeing perfect recall for every player.
Finally, payoffs associated with terminal nodes are randomly
drawn from a uniform distribution over r0, 1s. We generate
20 game instances for each combination of the following
parameters’ values: n P t3, 4, 5u, d P tn, . . . , 15u with step
size 1 (i.e., for games with 5 players, d P t5, 6, . . . , 15u),
ν P t0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0u. For simplicity, we fix the
branching factor to 2 (this value allows us to maximize d
and it is also the worst case for the inefficiency indices).
The algorithms are implemented in Python 2.7.6, adopt-
ing GUROBI 7.0 for LPs and ILPs, AMPL 20170207 and
global optimization solver BARON 17.1.2 (Tawarmalani
and Sahinidis 2005). We set a time limit to the algorithms of
60 minutes. All the algorithms are executed on a UNIX com-
puter with 2.33GHz CPU and 128 GB RAM. We discuss the
main experimental results with 3 players below, while the
results with more players are provided in the Appendices.
Since the computation of the TMECor from the reduced nor-
mal form is impractical for d ě 5 (see the Appendices),
we use only Algorithm 1 employing the exact oracle (this
demonstrated very fast on every instance).
Empirical PoUs. We report in Fig. 2 the average em-
piric inefficiency indices with 3 players for some values of
ν. We observe that, despite the theoretical worst-case value
increases in L, the empiric increase, if any, is negligible. For
instance, the worst-case value of PoUCom{Cor with n “ 3
and L “ 211 is ą 45, while the average empiric value is
ă 2. We also observe that the inefficiency increases in ν,
suggesting that it may be maximized in normal-form games.
Compute time. We report in Fig. 8 the average compute
times of the algorithms and their box plots with 3 play-
ers and ν “ 0.5 (the plot includes instances reaching the
time limit as this not affects results presentation). As ex-
pected, the TMECom computation scales well, allowing one
to solve games with more than 16,000 terminal nodes in
the time limit. The performances of Algorithm 1 (TMECor)
are remarkable since it solves games with more than 2,000
terminals in the time limit, and presents a narrow boxplot,
meaning that the variance in the compute time is small. No-
tice that, with d ď 10, the compute times of TMECom and
TMECor are comparable, even if the former is computa-
tionally hard while the latter is solvable in polynomial-time.
As expected, the TME computation does not scale well and
its compute time is extremely variable among different in-
stances.
Conclusions
In this paper, we focus on extensive-form team games with
a single adversary. Our main contributions include the def-
inition of game models employing different correlation de-
vices and their suitable solution concepts. We study the in-
efficiency a team incurs employing various forms of correla-
tion, providing lower bounds to the worst-case values of the
inefficiency indices that are arbitrarily large in the game tree.
Furthermore, we study the complexity of finding the equilib-
ria, and we provide exact algorithms. Finally, we experimen-
tally evaluate the scalability of our algorithms and the empir-
ical equilibrium inefficiency in random games. In the future,
it would be interesting to study approximate equilibrium-
finding algorithms in order to reach an improved scalability
in all the three correlation scenarios.
References
[Aumann 1974] Aumann, R. 1974. Subjectivity and corre-
lation in randomized strategies. Journal of Mathematical
Economics 1(1):67–96.
[Ausiello, Crescenzi, and Protasi 1995] Ausiello, G.;
Crescenzi, P.; and Protasi, M. 1995. Approximate solution
of np optimization problems. Theoretical Computer Science
150(1):1–55.
[Basilico et al. 2017] Basilico, N.; Celli, A.; Nittis, G. D.;
and Gatti, N. 2017. Team-maxmin equilibrium: efficiency
bounds and algorithms. In AAAI.
[Borgs et al. 2010] Borgs, C.; Chayes, J. T.; Immorlica, N.;
Kalai, A. T.; Mirrokni, V. S.; and Papadimitriou, C. H. 2010.
The myth of the folk theorem. Games and Economic Behav-
ior 70(1):34–43.
[Conitzer and Sandholm 2006] Conitzer, V., and Sandholm,
T. 2006. Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. In
ACM EC, 82–90.
[Forges 1986] Forges, F. 1986. An approach to communica-
tion equilibria. Econometrica 1375–1385.
[Gatti et al. 2012] Gatti, N.; Patrini, G.; Rocco, M.; and
Sandholm, T. 2012. Combining local search techniques and
path following for bimatrix games. In UAI, 286–295.
[Hansen et al. 2008] Hansen, K. A.; Hansen, T. D.; Mil-
tersen, P. B.; and Sørensen, T. B. 2008. Approximability
and parameterized complexity of minmax values. In WINE,
684–695.
[Ha˚stad 2001] Ha˚stad, J. 2001. Some optimal inapproxima-
bility results. Journal of the ACM (JACM) 48(4):798–859.
[Kohlberg and Mertens 1986] Kohlberg, E., and Mertens, J.-
F. 1986. On the strategic stability of equilibria. Economet-
rica: Journal of the Econometric Society 1003–1037.
[Koller and Megiddo 1992] Koller, D., and Megiddo, N.
1992. The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in ex-
tensive form. Games and economic behavior 4(4):528–552.
[Kuhn 1953] Kuhn, H. W. 1953. Extensive Games and the
Problem of Information. Princeton University Press. 193–
216.
[Lemke and Howson, Jr 1964] Lemke, C. E., and Howson,
Jr. 1964. Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games. Jour-
nal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
12(2):413–423.
[McMahan, Gordon, and Blum 2003] McMahan, H. B.;
Gordon, G. J.; and Blum, A. 2003. Planning in the presence
of cost functions controlled by an adversary. In Proceedings
of the 20th International Conference on Machine Learning
(ICML-03), 536–543.
[Nisan et al. 2007] Nisan, N.; Roughgarden, T.; Tardos, E.;
and Vazirani, V. 2007. Algorithmic game theory, volume 1.
Cambridge University Press.
[Raghavan and Tompson 1987] Raghavan, P., and Tompson,
C. D. 1987. Randomized rounding: a technique for prov-
ably good algorithms and algorithmic proofs. Combinator-
ica 7(4):365–374.
[Selten 1975] Selten, R. 1975. Reexamination of the per-
fectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games.
International journal of game theory 4(1):25–55.
[Shapley and Snow 1950] Shapley, L. S., and Snow, R. N.
1950. Basic solutions of discrete games. Annals of Mathe-
matics Studies 24:27–35.
[Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2009] Shoham, Y., and Leyton-
Brown, K. 2009. Multiagent systems: Algorithmic, game-
theoretic, and logical foundations.
[Tambe 2011] Tambe, M. 2011. Security and game theory:
algorithms, deployed systems, lessons learned. Cambridge
University Press.
[Tawarmalani and Sahinidis 2005] Tawarmalani, M., and
Sahinidis, N. V. 2005. A polyhedral branch-and-cut ap-
proach to global optimization. Mathematical Programming
103:225–249.
[von Stengel and Forges 2008] von Stengel, B., and Forges,
F. 2008. Extensive-form correlated equilibrium: Definition
and computational complexity. Mathematics of Operations
Research 33(4):1002–1022.
[von Stengel and Koller 1997] von Stengel, B., and Koller,
D. 1997. Team-maxmin equilibria. Games and Economic
Behavior 21(1):309 – 321.
[von Stengel 1996] von Stengel, B. 1996. Efficient computa-
tion of behavior strategies. Games and Economic Behavior
14(2):220 – 246.
[Williamson and Shmoys 2011] Williamson, D. P., and
Shmoys, D. B. 2011. The design of approximation
algorithms. Cambridge university press.
Appendices
Proofs of the Theorems
Theorem 4 BR-T is APX-hard.
Proof. We prove that MAX-SAT is AP-reducible to BR-T
(MAX-SATďAPBR-T). Given a boolean formula φ in con-
junctive normal form, MAX-SAT is the problem of deter-
mining the maximum number of clauses that can be made
true by a truth assignment to variables of φ.
For any φ with c clauses, we build, with a construction
similar to (von Stengel and Forges 2008, Theorem 1.3), a
STSA-EF-TG Γ as follows:
• N “ tA, T u, and T “ t1, 2u;
• A plays first and has a unique decision node xA (the root
of the tree), s.t. |ρpxAq| “ c;
• player 1 plays on the second level of the tree and has a
singleton information set for each clause in φ. Each infor-
mation set has, as its actions, the variables that appear in
the clause it identifies;
• player 2 plays on the third level of the tree. She has one
information set for each literal of φ. At each of her infor-
mation sets, player 2 chooses whether the literal has to be
positive or negative;
• UT “ 1 if the literal chosen by player 1 is true in the
assignment made by player 2.
Consider A to be randomizing uniformly over her actions.
With this construction, Γ has a pair of pure strategies for
the team members leading to payoff 1 iff φ is satisfiable.
Let fpφq denote the extensive-form game Γφ obtained by
the above construction starting from φ. Denote with br the
solution to BR-T for fpφq. Function gpφ,Γφ, brq maps the
best-response result back to a feasible assignment for the
MAX-SAT problem.
Once fixed rA so that each terminal sequence of A is se-
lected with probability 1{c, the objective functions of MAX-
SAT and BR-T are equivalent since maximizing the utility
of the team implies finding the maximum number of satisfi-
able instances in φ. Denote with OBJpΓqBR and OBJpφqMS
the value of the two objective functions of BR-T and MAX-
SAT, respectively. It holds 1cOBJpφqMS “ OBJpfpφqqBR.
For this reason, the AP-condition holds. Specifically, for any
φ, for any rational α ą 1, for any feasible solution br to BR-
T over Γφ “ fpφq, it holds:
OPTBRpΓφq
OBJBRpbrq ď α ùñ
OPTMSpφq
OBJMSpgpφ,Γφ, brqq ď 1`βpα´1q
where OPTBRp¨q and OPTMSp¨q are, respectively, the opti-
mal solutions to a given instance of the two problems and
β “ 1. Therefore, since MAX-SAT is an APX-complete
problem (see (Ausiello, Crescenzi, and Protasi 1995)) and
it is AP-reducible to BR-T, BR-T is APX-hard. l
Theorem 5 Denote with BR-T-h the problem BR-T over
STSA-EF-TG instances of fixed maximum depth 3h and
branching factor variable at each decision-node. It holds:
αBT-T-h ď pαMAX-SATqh.
Proof. We recall that αp¨q P r0, 1s denotes the best upper-
bound for the efficient approximation of maximization prob-
lem p¨q.
Let φ be a boolean formula in conjunctive normal form.
Fix the maximum depth of the tree to an arbitrary value
3h ě 1. Build a STSA-EF-TG Γφ following the construc-
tion explained in the proof of Theorem 4. At this point, for
each terminal node xj P L of Γφ s.t. UT pxjq “ 1, repli-
cate Γφ by substituting xj with the root of a new Γ
xj
φ “ Γφ.
Repeat this procedure on the terminal nodes of the newly
added subtrees until the longest path from the root of Γφ to
one of the new leafs traverses h copies of the original tree.
Denote the full tree obtained through this process with Γ1φ.
The maximum depth of Γ1φ is 3h and it contains the set of
tΓx1φ , . . . ,Γxkφ u replicas of Γφ.
Suppose, by contradiction, there exists a polynomial-
time approximation algorithm for BR-T-h guaranteeing a
constant approximation factor α1BR-T-h ą pαMAX-SATqh.
Apply this algorithm to find an approximate solution to
BR-T-h over Γ1φ. For at least one of the sub-trees in
tΓφ,Γx1φ , . . . ,Γxkφ u, it has to hold: αxjBR-T-h ą αMAX-SAT,
where αxjBR-T-h is the approximation ratio obtained by the
algorithm for the problem BR-T-h over Γxjφ . As shown in
the proof of Theorem 4, a solution to BR-T over a tree ob-
tained with our construction can be mapped back to obtain
an approximate solution to MAX-SAT. The same reasoning
holds for BR-T-h. Therefore, if αxjBR-T-h ą αMAX-SAT, then
α
xj
MAX-SAT ą αMAX-SAT, where αxjMAX-SAT is the approxima-
tion ratio obtained approximating the MAX-SAT instance by
mapping the solution of BR-T-h over Γxjφ . Therefore, the ap-
proximation algorithm guarantees a constant approximation
factor for MAX-SAT which is strictly greater that its theo-
retical upper bound, which is a contradiction. l
On the approximation algorithm
As mentioned in the main paper, a simple approximation al-
gorithm for the BR-T problem can be obtained by relaxing
the binary constraints xplq P t0, 1u and then applying ran-
domized rounding (Raghavan and Tompson 1987). The lin-
ear program relaxation of the ILP oracle is:
arg max
r1,...,rpn´1q,x
ÿ
lPL
UT plqxplqrAppathpl|tnuqq s.t.
ÿ
qiPQi
Fiph, qiqripqiq “ fiphq @iPT,@hPHiYthHu
xplq ď ripqiq @iPT,@lPL,@qiPpathpl|tiuq
0 ď xplq ď 1 @l P L
Let pr1˚ , . . . , r˚pn´1q, x˚q be an optimal solution to the
LP relaxation. We select the approximate best-response,
which has to be a pure realization plan for each player,
by selecting actions according to probabilities specified by
r1˚ , . . . , r
˚
pn´1q. Notice that, once an action has been se-
lected, probability values at the next decision-node of the
team have to be rescaled so that they sum to one (therefore,
the rounding process starts from the root).
Let us focus on games encoding MAX-SAT instances.
Specifically, denote with φ a generic boolean formula in con-
junctive normal form and with Γφ the STSA-EF-TG built
as specified in the proof of Theorem 4. It is interesting to
notice that, for any φ, the application of our approximation
algorithm to Γφ guarantees the same approximation ratio of
randomized rounding applied to the relaxation of the ILP
formulation of MAX-SAT.
Denote with ARBR-T and ARMAX-SAT the approximate algo-
rithms based on randomized rounding for BR-T and MAX-
SAT respectively. The following result holds:
Proposition 2 For any φ, the approximation ratio forMAX-
SAT over φ obtained by the solution of BR-T over Γφ trough
ARBR-T is guaranteed to be at least p1 ´ 1{eq, i.e., the ratio
guaranteed by ARMAX-SAT.
Proof. The relaxation of the MAX-SAT ILP (ARMAX-SAT) is
the following linear formulation:
max
ÿ
cPCφ
vc s.t.
vc ď
ÿ
iPPc
yi `
ÿ
iPNc
p1´ yiq c P Cφ
0 ď yi ď 1 @iLφ
0 ď zc ď 1 @c P Cφ
where Cφ is set of clauses of φ, Lφ is the set of literals of
φ, Pc and Nc are the sets of literals appearing in clause c
non-negated or negated respectively, yi is the probability of
setting literal i to true.
Consider a game Γφ encoding a generic φ. If we apply
the relaxation of the best-response oracle to Γφ, ARBR-T and
ARMAX-SAT are equivalent. To see that, first let player 2 deter-
mine her realization plan r2˚ . Once r2˚ has been fixed, player
1 has, at each of her information sets, a fixed expected util-
ity υa associated with each of her available actions a. Let
ta1, . . . , aku be the set of available actions at one of the in-
formation sets of player 1. There are three possible cases:
1.
ř
aPta1,...,aku υa ă 1. In this case player 1 selects, for
each a, a probability ppaq ě υa.
2. Da P ta1, . . . , aku, υa “ 1. In this case, playing a with
probability 1 guarantees player 1 to satisfy the corre-
sponding clause.
3.
ř
aPta1,...,aku υa ě 1 and @a P ta1, . . . , aku, υa ă 1. In
this case, a1 is selected with probability ppa1q “ υa1 , a2
is selected with probability ppa2q “ mint1´ ppa1q, υa2u
and so on. The resulting strategy profile guarantees ex-
pected utility one for the corresponding clause.
Therefore, the value reachable in each clause is determined
only by the choice of player 2, i.e., the final utility of the
team depends only on r2˚ . Being the objective functions of
the two formulations equivalent, the relaxed oracle enforces
the same probability distribution over literals’ truth assign-
ments. That is, the optimal values of r2˚ and yi˚ are equiv-
alent. Notice that, in these game instances, player 2 plays
only on one level and we can sample a solution to MAX-
SAT according to r2˚ as if it was yi˚ . Therefore, randomized
rounding of r2˚ leads to the same approximation guarantee
ofARMAX-SAT, i.e., p1´1{eq (Williamson and Shmoys 2011).
l
On forcing T-observability
Algorithm 2 provides a possible implementation of the pro-
cedure described in the proof of Lemma 1. Denote with Γ the
initial game tree and with Γˆ the corresponding T-observable
game. The function receives as input: the current node x; the
current sequence for the team q, a dictionary ids specifying,
for each player, an available information set id; a dictionary
of dictionaries d, with the first level indexed over tuples of
sequences, and the second level indexed over identifiers of
information sets of Γ (i.e., pairs player/information-set id);
the id of the adversary (adv). By initializing x to the root
of the tree, the algorithm traverses the tree and assigns new
information sets ids when possible, partitioning the old in-
formation structure of Γ. Once the execution is completed,
d can be used to create Γˆ. Let us denote with qx and hx the
team sequence and information set defined by decision node
x in Γ. For each decision-node x of Γ s.t. ιpxq P T , the cor-
responding decision node in Γˆ is assigned an information set
with id drqxsrhxs.
Algorithm 2 Forcing T-Observability
1: function FORCE-T-OBS(x, q, ids, d, adv)
2: if x is not terminal then
3: plÐ x.player
4: is teamÐ pl ‰ adv
5: if is team then
6: iÐ ppl, x.idq
7: qt Ð tuplepqq
8: if qt in d then
9: if i not in drqts then
10: drqtsris Ð idsrpls
11: idsrpls Ð idsrpls ` 1
12: else
13: drqts Ð ti : idsrplsu
14: idsrpls Ð idsrpls ` 1
15: for y in x.children do
16: if is team then
17: q.append(y.action in)
18: FORCE-T-OBS(y, q, ids, d, adv)
19: if is team then
20: q.pop()
21: return d
Additional Experimental Results
Empiric PoUs. We present the box plots describing the em-
piric inefficiency indexes on all the experimental instances.
Figure 4 describes the empiric PoUCom{No, Figure 5 de-
scribes the empiric PoUCor{No, and Figure 6 describes the
empiric PoUCom{Cor. Notice that each plot displays data
for a number of actions up to the biggest instances solvable
within the time threshold by both the equilibrium-finding al-
gorithms involved in the ratio.
TMECor in reduced normal form. Computing a
TMECor through its reduced normal form (Kohlberg and
Mertens 1986) is impractical even for relatively small game
instances. Figure 7 shows that, for 3-player games with
ν “ 0.5, the algorithm does not reach termination within the
deadline even for instances of depth 6. Moreover, the amount
of memory required by the algorithm would make the com-
putation unfeasible even with a higher time thresholds. In-
stances of 3-player STSA-EF-TGs with depth 6 required, at
least, around 20Gb of memory each, with the most demand-
ing instances requiring more than 70Gb. Being the growth of
the reduced normal form exponential in the size of the tree,
this approach is not feasible for bigger game instances.
Compute time. Figure 8 shows the compute times for all
the instances of our experimental setting. The behavior dis-
played by the equilibrium-finding algorithms is essentially
the one described in the main paper for all the game config-
urations.
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Figure 4: Box plots of the PoUCom{No inefficiency index.
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Figure 5: Box plots of the PoUCor{No inefficiency index.
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Figure 6: Boxplots of the PoUCom{Cor inefficiency index.
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Figure 7: Average compute times and box plots of the computation of TMECor through the reduced normal form. The plot is
on 3-player instances with ν “ 0.5.
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Figure 8: Average compute times of the algorithms and their box plots with every game configuration.
